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I. INTRODUCTION
Human rights law has evolved considerably over the past half-century.
Much of this evolution has occurred at the international level. Evolution can,
of course, consist of growth and expansion, or decline and regression. For the
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most part, the recent international evolution of human rights law has tended
towards growth and expansion.
Growth can involve the creation of new mechanisms to enforce basic civil
rights by holding accountable those who violate these rights. In recent years,.
the creation of mechanisms to promote accountability has become a focal point
of activity for international lawyers. This activity has most immediately
culminated in the adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (Rome Statute)' in July, 1998. The Rome Statute innovates on both the
procedural and substantive fronts. Along with creating an enforcement
mechanism in the form of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the Rome
Statute also refines prior customary and conventional rules by providing a
detailed list of what can prospectively be sanctioned as the "most serious crimes
of concern to the international community as a whole."2 In this regard, the
Rome Statute creates important linkages between human rights, international
humanitarian law, and international criminal law. This gives rise to what one
scholar has labeled the "humanization" of international humanitarian law.3
Although there has been considerable parallelism between international
human rights and international humanitarian law, this has, for the most part,
occurred within the nexus of classic human rights such as the right to life, the
right to freedom from persecution, and the right to bodily integrity. The
evolution and growth of social and political rights, and their penetration into the
world of international humanitarian law, has been much slower. A tradition-
ally socio-political right whose exploration shall constitute the focus of this
Article is the right to live in a healthy and productive environment, which some
have called "environmental security."4 For the most part, the linkage between
international humanitarian law and environmental security is weak and may in
fact reflect a somewhat troubling disjunction between international environ-
mental law and humanitarian concerns. Although international humanitarian
law may well be "humanized," it is not showing signs of being "environ-
mentalized."
The gap between international humanitarian law and environmental
security should trouble international lawyers. Just as armed conflict often
creates a context in which the most serious human rights abuses occur, so too,
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) [Rome
Statute].
2. Id. at art. 5(1).
3. See comments of Professor Theodor Meron at the Opening Session of the International Law
Association International Law Weekend (November 4-6, 1999) (notes on file with the author).
4. See, e.g., Bernard A. Weintraub, Environmental Security, Environmental Management, and
Environmental Justice, 12 PACE ENVTL. L REv. 533, 546 (1995) ("environmental security... refers to a
community's state of assurance that its stability as a community will not be threatened by a lack of proper
management of the natural resources it deems to be necessary parts of its identity").
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does it create a similar context for the infliction of wanton and extensive
destruction to the environment. This destruction creates profound environ-
mental insecurity. Part (H1) of this Article explores the insecurities caused by
the environmental consequences of armed conflict. Although the international
community has shown considerable concern for the humanitarian consequences
of war,5 it has been significantly more hesitant in accounting for war's
environmental consequences. It is for this reason that a very fruitful
exploration of the progress that has been made and that still needs to be made
in terms of harmonizing international humanitarian law with environmental
protection can emerge from a study of how the international community
monitors the environmental consequences of war. Part (Ell) examines the
successes and failures of the international legal order in controlling these
consequences and directs its focus on the ICC's jurisdiction to prosecute
environmental war crimes. Part (IV) argues that the ICC may not be
particularly well-suited to sanction environmentally destructive behavior. This
raises the more penetrating question whether punitive criminal approaches
pursued in isolation of other policy devices can ever promote environmental
security. Part (V) is proscriptive, sketching ways in which the promotion of
environmental security can be made more effective. Part (V) posits that the
effective promotion of environmental security requires a multifaceted approach,
which combines criminal prosecution, preventative measures, and specially
tailored remedies. An additional element of this multifaceted approach,
inspired by environmental justice litigation in the United States, involves more
proactive use of international anti-discrimination conventions to guard against
the infliction of environmental insecurity on already disempowered groups. In
the end, this encourages environmental security to become more closely
integrated with both the protection of human rights and international
humanitarian law.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
OF ARMED CONFLICT
Modification or desecration of the natural environment has often been
used as a strategic mechanism to safeguard state sovereignty. Over two mil-
5. See, e.g., 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; 1949 Geneva Convention H for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea,
August 12, 1949,75 U.N.T.S. 85; 1949 Geneva Convention IlI Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; 1949 Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. The Security Council's creation of ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda also evinces the international
community's concern for the humanitarian consequences of war. See also Rome Statute, supra note 1.
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lennia ago, Roman soldiers salted the soil of Carthage. Much more recently,
Agent Orange was used to defoliate the Vietnamese jungle. In fact, it is
estimated that, from 1962 to 1971, the United States sprayed twelve million
gallons of defoliant over more than ten percent of what was then South
Vietnam.6 United States estimates reveal that fourteen percent of the area's
forests were destroyed.' Other estimates place the figure at nearly one-third.'
Regardless of the exact numbers, "broad stretches of the landscape are still bare
of trees." 9 Civilians and soldiers who had been exposed to defoliants claim to
have passed the ill-effects through their family lines. In fact, there are tens of
thousands of physically or mentally disabled children in Vietnam whose
disabilities can be linked to the spraying of Agent Orange which occurred
before they were born or even conceived.' °
During the 1990-1991 Gulf War, vast quantities of oil were dumped into
the Persian Gulf to contaminate Kuwait's water supply." Kuwaiti oil wells
were also deliberately ignited by Iraqi troops. 2 Remedying the losses and
damages suffered as a direct result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation
of Kuwait has prompted the creation of the United Nations Compensation
Commission (UNCC) as a subsidiary organ of the United Nations. 3 The
UNCC is a unique initiative (part court of law, part arbitral tribunal) which
adopts mass tort litigation approaches to settle claims and pay compensation,
including for damage to the Kuwaiti environment and public health. Iraq,
whose liability is presumed, is to pay reparations out of its frozen international
6. Seth Mydans, Vietnam Sees War's Legacy in Its Young, N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 1999), at 12.
Two commentators have argued that the Vietnam War's "environmental damages offered a rallying point for
opponents of the conflict and catalyzed political animus against the war." See Peter J. Richards and Michael
N. Schmitt, Mars Meets Mother Nature: Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict, 28 STETSON
L. REV. 1047, 1053 (1999).
7. Id.
8. See Oscar Arias, Responsibility of Nations to the Environment, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL,
ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES (June 10-12, 1998).
9. Mydans, supra note 7.
10. There is evidence that dioxin, the poisonous residue of Agent Orange, contributes to the types
of birth defects found in Vietnam. However, much of this evidence is "anecdotal" and is disputed by the
United States, which persists in refusing to take responsibility. Id.
11. Richards and Schmitt, supra note 7, at 1055.
12. See Public Authority for Assessment of Compensation of Damages Resulting from Iraqi
Aggression, OIL ANDENViRONMENTALCLAIMS BULLETN (Aug. 1997). Independent of the damage to Kuwait
and to the Persian Gulf waters, it is estimated that the oil well fires set by Iraqi soldiers expelled one to two
million tons of carbon dioxide, which in 1991 represented one percent of total global carbon dioxide
emissions. Id. at 8. One commentator has estimated that over 700 oil wells were ignited. See Weintraub,
supra note 4, at 536.
13. Created by virtue of Security Council Resolution 687, U.N. SCOR, 2981 st mtg. at 7, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/687 (1991).
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assets as well as from a portion of its future oil export earnings. Thus far, 2.6
million claims have been filed.'4 The asserted value of claims is still to be
resolved $320 billion. 5 Of those claims which have been resolved, nearly 15
million has been awarded in compensation to aggrieved partners.
Reports of significant ecological destruction are also emerging from the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). NATO aerial bombardment of the FRY
under Operation Allied Force has resulted in the destruction of oil refining
installations as well as storage facilities for other industrial products. Much of
this destruction arose from the indiscriminate effects of bombing from very
high altitude levels.' 6 In particular, the destruction of a petrochemical, fertilizer
and refinery complex in Pancevo resulted in the discharge of oil, gasoline, and
dichloride (a powerful carcinogen) into the Danube river.'7 The bombardment
of the Pancevo facility also caused the emission of toxic gases.' 8 The result,
according to one Western observer, is an "ecological disaster," with the
pollution "spread[ing] downstream to Romania and Bulgaria and then into the
Black Sea."' 9 Scientists are also very concerned that extensive flooding may
result from ice which may form on the Danube and then become lodged behind
three bridges in Novi Sad which were bombed during Operation Allied Force.20
The areas most at risk include low-lying portions of Serbia, as well as Croatia
and parts of Hungary. 2
In short, "[f]rom antiquity to the present, examples of environmental
destruction in war abound."22 But it is not only actual war which creates
environmental insecurity. The environment also faces severe threats as nations
prepare to go to war (mobilization) and as nations turn back from the threat of
14. Jay Austin and Carl Bruch, The Greening of Warfare, 15:6 ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 32, 33
(1998). See also, United Nations Compensation, www.UNOQ.ch/uncc/stats.htm (visited on-March 6,2000).
15. Id.
16. One scholar has in fact argued that the patterns of the NATO bombings trigger important
international humanitarian law concerns. See comments of Professor Julie Mertus, "The Imprint of Kosovo
on International Law" Panel, International Law Weekend (November 4-6, 1999) (notes on file with the
author).
17. Tom Walker, Missile Strikes Pollute Danube, GLOBE AND MAIL (April 19, 1999) at 1.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Marlise Simons, Hungary Says Danube's Bombed-OutBridges May Cause Floods, N.Y. TIMES
(October 24, 1999). One hurdle which will have to be overcome in the repair of the bridges is that the FRY
government maintains there are still unexploded missiles and other ordnance in the Danube. Id.
21. Id.
22. Richards and Schmitt, supra note 7, at 1051. See also Neil A. F. Popovic, Humanitarian Law,
Protection of the Environment, and Human Rights, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 69 (1995) (providing
examples of deliberate dam-busting by armed forces during the Second Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945,
World War 11, and the Korean War).
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war (decommissioning and disarmament).' On this latter point, Russian
attempts to decommission its nuclear submarines in the Arctic Ocean are being
carried out with insufficient financial and human resources and seriously
threaten that particularly fragile marine environment.24 Testing of weapons -
specifically nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - also has particularly
noxious effects on the environment. These activities collateral to actual armed
conflict therefore require regulation. Nonetheless, for the most part, multi-
lateral legal structures only provide limited supervision and monitoring for the
environmental consequences of such activities.
I. THE ICC AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE LANGUAGE OF THE
ROME STATUTE
It is only very recently that the international community has made inroads
into contemplating the prosecution of those who engage in unacceptable use of
the environment during wartime. In this regard, the language of the Rome
Statute is important. For the first time, environmental war crimes are
independently sanctioned and an apparatus is provided for the punishment of
those who commit such crimes. Although there was some scattered mention of
environmental war crimes at the Nuremberg Trials,25 over the past five decades
humanitarian abuses have been treated separately from environmental
desecration. This disconnect is revealed in the Statute of the International
23. Mobilization should also include the day-to-day maintenance of military bases. It is reported
that it would take "enormous diversions of money and effort to remediate the numerous hazardous waste sites
that the United States military has created at its many military bases." See Weintraub, supra note 4, at 582.
Should military bases not be run in an environmentally sensitive manner, the threat of environmental
degradation and contamination increases.
24. SYMPOSIUM RATIONALE, ARMS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: PREVENTING THE PERILS OF
DISARMAMENT, University of Tulsa (Dec. 9B 10, 1999) ("Many of the past and potentially adverse future
global environmental impacts on the Arctic caused by Russian nuclear dumping have obstructed and delayed
the implementation and multiplied the costs of implementing START I [n.b. the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaties]. The United States, Norway, and the international community are trying, ex post, to address and
prevent these unforeseen problems, but might have done so more effectively and efficiently ex ante."). See
also, Elizabeth Kirk, The Environmental Implications of Arms Control Agreement (Paper on file with author).
25. See, e.g., German General Rendulic was acquitted of charges that he perpetrated a scorched
earth policy as his forces evacuated Norway. See The Hostage Case (U.S. v. list), 11 T.W.C. 759 (1950).
Rendulic alleged he believed his forces were being chased by Soviet forces. As a result, he maintained that
the environmental destruction was militarily necessary. As it turned out, Rendulic's forces were not being
chased by Soviet forces. However, it was held that Rendulic's belief, although mistaken, was reasonably
held. Id. The Rendulic case is a classic example of the operation of military necessity as a defense to
environmental crimes. See Ensign Florencio J. Yuzon, Deliberate Environmental Modification through the
Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons: " Greening' the International Laws of Armed Conflict to
Establish an Environmentally Protective Regime, 11 AM. U. J. INT'L L & POL'Y 793, 815 (1996).
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Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia26 and the Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda." Neither Tribunal is directly em-
powered to prosecute those who propagate environmental insecurity through the
commission of environmental war crimes. The International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia has some jurisdiction over war crimes which bear
an incidental relationship to the security of the natural environment. 2' The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda essentially lacks jurisdiction over
even incidental violations of environmental security. 9
26. U.N. SCOR 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993), Annex [hereinafter Statute of the
ICTY].
27. U.N. SCOR 955 S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 3453d mtg., (Nov. 8, 1994), Annex [hereinafter
Statute of the ICTR].
28. The ICTY has jurisdiction over a series of war crimes. See Statute of the ICTY, supra note 27,
art. at 3. Environmental desecration does not figure among the listed crimes. There is, however, jurisdiction
over a series of war crimes which bear an incidental relationship with environmental insecurity. See id. These
include: employment of poisonous weapons (art. 3(a)); wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or
devastation not justified by military necessity (art. 3(b)); attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of
undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings (art. 3(c)); and plunder of public property (art. 3(e)). The
ICTY can also prosecute as a war crime the extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified
by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly (art. 2(d)). However, these crimes do not
involve environmental destruction as a crime per se. Instead they focus on damage to human environments
and property. Without the immediate causal link to human harm there can be no liability. This provides no
jurisdiction to hold individuals accountable for wanton environmental destruction, regardless of the long-term
effects of that destruction on human life or environmental security. The ICTY's jurisdiction over war crimes
is not limited to those enumerated in the Statute of the ICTY. Id. at art. 3. However, so far no one has been
prosecuted for environmental war crimes.' See Preparatory Commission Request, infra note 39, at 29. As
a result, the ICTY has not been called upon to decide whether it has the discretionary jurisdiction to address
such crimes. Id
29. Statute of the ICTR, supra note 28, at art. 4. One crime over which the ICTR has jurisdiction
that bears a remote relationship to the environment is "pillage." Id at art. 4(f). Jurisdiction can also be
exercised over "violence to health of persons" and "acts of terrorism." Id. at arts. 4(a) and 4(d). Both of these
crimes have an even more remote relationship with the protection of the natural environment. However, there
have been no charges involving these war crimes. Given the profound environmental insecurity arising out
of the Rwandan conflict, the lack of jurisdiction over environmental war crimes is disappointing. The
Rwandan conflict has seen two national parks (Pare national des volcans and Parc national de l'Akagdra)
landmined, endangered species (the mountain gorillas) poached, agricultural lands rendered barren in order
to coerce the migration of persecuted peoples, and systemic resettlement exhausting moderate lands
specifically in eastern Congo of their agricultural capacities. See Mark Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid
Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in Rwanda's Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 545 (1998). The domestic war crimes prosecutions which are occurring in Rwanda have also been
completely reticent in the area of environmental crimes.
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Under the language of the Rome Statute, however, intentional infliction
of harm to the environment may constitute a war crime. 0 More specifically,
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) prohibits [emphasis added]:
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack
will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to
the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated. 1
The negotiation history of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) merits a brief review. The
draft of the Rome Statute which served as the basis for the final negotiations
listed three other options along with the language which was eventually adopted
in Article 8(2)(b)(iv).3" The three rejected options are:
1. Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe
damage to the natural environment which is not justified by military
necessity; (Or)
2. Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term, and severe
damage to the natural environment;
(Or)
3. No paragraph [in other words, no prohibition on intentionally
inflicting widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment].
In the end, the provision which was adopted was a compromise and, from
an environmental perspective, occupies a middle ground. However, it shares
with the first option the important limitation that environmental integrity is
secondary to the military advancement of national security interests. There are
other important limitations. The jurisdiction of the ICC is restricted to "war
30. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 5(1)(c) (vesting the ICC with jurisdiction over war crimes).
Articles 5(l)(d) and 5(2) create jurisdiction over "crimes of aggression." However, the definition of this term
is not provided; in fact, the Rome Statute leaves it to the parties to define this term in the future. Id. Those
concerned with environmental issues may view the open-ended nature of crimes of aggression as a potential
device to expand the ICC's jurisdiction over environmental matters.
31. Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(iv)(emphasis added).
32. Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.249/1998/CRP.8 (2 April 1998), section B(b) to the "War Crimes" section of Part 2 (visited Feb. 18,
2000) <http://www.un.org/icc> [hereinafter "Draft Rome Statute"]. The Draft Rome Statute is on file with
the author.
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crimes in particular when committed as a part of a plan or policy or as part of
a large-scale commission of such crimes."33 The question consequently arises
whether the "in particular" language will allow isolated incidents to fall within
the purview of the Rome Statute. A more important limitation, however, is the
fact that prohibiting harm to the natural environment is explicitly mentioned
only once in the entire Rome Statute.34 This provision may therefore become
peripheral given the broad array of other crimes to which the ICC's energies
will be directed. As a result, the effect of this provision may well be more
apparent than real. Also, the environmental war crimes provision of the Rome
Statute only applies to inter-state armed conflicts. Environmental desecration
during internecine conflicts is consequently left unaddressed. 5 This is a
33. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 8(1). Another limitation to the effectiveness of the ICC in
the area of warcrimes is the fact that any signatory state can opt out of the ICC's jurisdiction over war crimes
alleged to have been committed by that state's nationals or on that state's territory. See id. at art. 124.
34. In other places, the Rome Statute prohibits as a "war crime" conduct which may be collaterally
related to the well-being of the natural environment, or have some other ancillary connection. See, e.g., id.
at art. 8(2)(a)(iv) (sanctions extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justified by military
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly). Article 8(2)(b) prohibits other serious violations of the
laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international
law, namely: (ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects; (iii) Intentionally directing attacks
against.., installations, material... involved in a humanitarian assistance or a peacekeeping mission; (v)
Attacking or bombing... dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives;
(ix) Intentionally directing attacks against... [inter alia] historic monuments; (xiii) Destroying or seizing
the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;
(xvi) Pillaging a town or place; (xxv) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by
depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival. The Rome Statute also criminalizes the use of
certain weapons with destructive effects on both humanity as well as the natural environment. See id. at art.
8(2)(b). Prohibited practices include: (xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons; (xviii) Employing
asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices. Many of these
weapons are already prohibited by other international agreements. See, e.g., Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious
or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, 35 U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doe. A/CONF 95/15, Oct. 27, 1980, 19
I.L.M. 1523; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and
of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571; Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800.
35. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, at arts. 8(2)(c) & (e). These articles list the types of war crimes
punishable within internal armed conflicts. Intentionally inflicting widespread, long-term and severe harm
to the environment is omitted from this list. Basic principles of treaty interpretation provide that this
omission is deliberate and evinces a desire not to punish environmental desecration when committed in an
internal conflict. Further limitations on the application of the entire Rome Statute to internal conflicts are
found in Article 8(2)(f), which provides.
Paragraph 2(e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does not apply to
situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence or other
acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take place in the territory of a State when there is
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troubling gap.36 Also troubling is the fact that the ICC can only capture
environmental crimes committed by military forces actively engaged in
hostilities. There is therefore no jurisdiction to sanction the environmental
insecurity created by armed forces in the testing of weapons or in the
mobilization of forces. Nor is there jurisdiction to supervise any disarmament
process,37 notably the modalities of decommissioning and their environmental
effects.
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) also triggers more specific interpretive concerns. By
way of overview, there are three principal components to the language of
Article 8(2)(b)(iv): (1) the actual physical act:- or actus reus - which consists
of launching an attack which causes "widespread, long-term and severe
damage" to the natural environment; (2) a second material element, namely
that the damage must be "clearly excessive" in relation to the "concrete and
direct overall military advantage anticipated"; and (3) even if both material
elements are found, the mental element - or mens rea - must be demonstrated,
thereby entailing proof that the attack was launched intentionally and in the
knowledge it will cause "widespread, long-term, and severe damage" to the
natural environment.
protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such
groups. Id. [emphasis added]. In sum, nations appear less willing to criminaize conduct in internal conflicts
than in international conflicts. This gives rise to concern that the protection of both humanity and the
environment in internal conflicts may be inadequate. However, even the limited jurisdiction obtained over
internal conflicts represents a major step forward. After all, such intrusion into internal affairs is one of the
most jealously guarded elements of state sovereignty.
36. See discussion of the environmental effects of internal conflicts in Rwanda, supra note 30.
There are other examples of intentional environmental degradation occurring during internal conflicts. See
infra note 134, for a discussion of the effects of the El Salvadoran, Nicaraguan, and Colombian conflict. In
the Colombian conflict, it is reported that a "guerrilla group... attempted to undermine the authority of the
government by repeatedly blowing up the nation's largest oil pipeline, spilling more than 600,000 gallons of
oil into east Andes wetlands." See Weintraub, supra note 4, at 583, citing James Brooke, Colombia Rebels
Turn to Ecological Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 1990). Insurgency and counter-insurgency guerilla civil
wars have a particularly devastating effect on local environments. Insurgents often use tropical forests as
home bases and hiding grounds; counter-insurgency forces often respond by slashing and burning forests,
together with polluting rivers. The Cambodian conflict reflects a different, yet equally destructive, misuse of
the environment during an internal armed conflict. It is reported that "the Khmer Rouge has survived in the
rainforests on the Thai-Cambodian border by decimating the forests there and selling concessions to log the
timber and mine whatever minerals can be found in that region. This abuse of Cambodia's natural resources
can be understood to be a threat not only to Cambodia's environmental security . . . but also to the
environmental security of all those who rely on, or support, the protection of the Cambodian rainforests."
See id. at 602-03.
37. Supra note 25 ("disarming nuclear and chemical weapons and weapon systems does ... create
environmental impacts").
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A. The Physical Act: Widespread, Long-term and Severe Damage
A successful prosecution under the Rome Statute will, first and foremost,
have to show that the accused launched an attack3" which caused "widespread,
long-term, and severe damage to the natural environment." Of great importance
is that all three elements must conjunctively be proven. The language of
"widespread, long-term and severe" has woven its way into the handful of
other international humanitarian conventions which address the use of the
environment in times of war, for example the 1977 United Nations Convention
on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques (ENMOD Convention),39 and the 1977 Additional
Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Convention (Protocol I).40 However, by
providing that all three elements must be conjunctively shown to exist, the
38. "Attack" has been defined as an act of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or
defense." See Protocol I on the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978) [hereinafter Protocol ], art. 49(!). See also
PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE INERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY JAPAN,
U.N. Doc. PCNICCt1999/WGEC/DP. 12 (July 22, 1999). The attack cannot be isolated or sporadic, but must
involve the Ause of armed force to carry out a military operation during the course of an armed conflict." See
REQUEST FROM THE GOVERNMENTS OF BELGIUM, COSTA RICA, FINLAND, HUNGARY, THE REPUBLIC OF
KOREA, SOUTH AFRICA ANDTHE PERMANENTOBSERVER MISSION OF SwrIZERLANDTo THE UNITED NATIONS
REGARDING THE TEXT PREPARED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMrrTEE OF THE RED CROSS ON ARTICLE 8,
2(B), (I), ( ), (i), (IV), (V), (VI), (VII), (IX), (Xl) AND (XII) OF THE STATURE, UN Doe. PCNICC/1999/WGEC/
INF.2/Add. 1 (July 30, 1999) 29 [hereinafter Preparatory Commission Request].
39. United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of
Environmental Modification Techniques, May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333 (entered into force Oct. 5, 1978)
[ENMOD Convention], which prohibits engagement "in military ... environmental modification techniques
having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage, or injury to any other
State Party." The ENMOD Convention focuses on the use of the environment as a weapon - as a result,
wanton destruction of the environment occurring as a byproduct ofa military campaign might not fall within
its parameters. See Richards and Schmitt, supra note 7, at 1063 ("Mhe 1977 ENMOD Convention ...
merely limits the use of modification of the environment as a tool or weapon of warfare."). Environmental
damage per se is for the most part not a concern of the ENMOD Convention. See Richards and Schmitt,
supra note 7, at 1063. Some of the activities prohibited by the ENMOD Convention amount to outrageous
behavior not within the military capability of most nations for example: inducing earthquakes and tidal
waves, or activating quiescent volcanoes.
40. Protocol I, supra note 39, at art. 35(3) (prohibits "methods or means of warfare which are
intended, or may be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural
environment"). Id at art. 55 states that:
Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe
damage. This protection includes a prohibition on the use of methods or means of warfare which are intended
or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and thereby to prejudice the health or
survival of the population. Attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals are prohibited. See
also id. at arts. 54, 56 (which provide for the protection of property, which has ancillary benefits for the
environment.) The United States has not yet ratified Protocol I, in part owing to objections over its
environmental provisions. See Richards and Schmitt, supra note 7, at 1054.
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language of the Rome Statute regresses from the wording of the ENMOD
Convention which bases fault disjunctively on proof of only one of these three
characteristics.
What exactly do "widespread," "long-term," and "severe" mean? The
Rome Statute is silent on this point. The International Law Commission (ILC)
has concluded that "widespread, long-term and severe" describes the "extent or
intensity of the damage, its persistence in time, and the size of the geographical
area affected by the damage."'" However, the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) recognizes that the more specific question "as to what
constitutes 'widespread, long-term, and severe' damage... to the environment
is open to interpretation."42 In this regard, some interpretive guidance can be
provided by the work of the Geneva Conference of the Committee on
Disarmament Understanding (CCD Understanding) regarding the application
of these terms under the ENMOD Convention.43 This additional work was
necessary since the ENMOD Convention does not itself define these terms.
The CCD Understanding provides as follows:
1. "Widespread" encompassing an area on the scale of several
hundred square kilometers;
2. "Long-term" lasting for a period of months, or approximately a
season;
3. "Severe" involving serious or significant disruption or harm to
human life, natural and economic resources or other assets.
Regrettably, the interpretive value of the CCD Understanding is curtailed
by the fact that it stipulates that its use is limited to the ENMOD Convention
and is not intended to prejudice the interpretation of similar terms if used in
another international agreement." As the ENMOD Convention deals with
"extraordinary manipulations of the natural environment for military purposes,
such as creating floods, it is unclear what weight, if any, it would be given by
the [ICC]."45 As it turns out, greater interpretive guidance may be obtained
from commentaries on Protocol I, especially since its language is, like the Rome
41. UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2241, 22 August 1991, pp. 15, 18, cited in Preparatory Commission
Request, supra note 39, at 33.
42. UN Doc. A/48/269, p. 9. See also Doc. A/47/328, 31 July 1992, paras. 20, 63, cited in
Preparatory Commission Request, supra note 39, at 34.
43. Understanding I of the Conference of the Committee of Disarmament, reprinted in Convention
on the Prohibition of Military orAny Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques: Hearing
Before Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978) [CCD Understanding].
44. Id. (It is further understood that the interpretation set forth above is intended exclusively for
this Convention and is not intended to prejudice the interpretation of the same or similar terms of used in
connection with any other international agreement.). See also Richards and Schmitt, supra note 7, at 1065.
45. Austin and Bruch, supra note 15, at 38.
Statute's, conjunctive in nature. From an environmental perspective, the
prohibitions in Protocol I are more circumscribed than those of ENMOD. For
example, "long-term" has been interpreted by the ICRC as meaning lasting for
"decades rather than months."
6
The "widespread" and "long-term" principles attempt to ascribe temporal
and geographic limitations to environmental harm which, for the most part,
does not know such boundaries. As the planet constitutes one single ecosystem,
environmental degradation of one part of the earth ultimately affects the entire
planet.4 7 The "severe" requirement could mean that damage to an isolated
section of the global commons whose natural resources have not yet been
valued by global financial markets could escape punishment; and this
notwithstanding its biodiversity or species-importance. The anthropocentric
limitation of "severe" damage to that which affects human life and human
consumption of natural resources underscores a more general shortcoming with
much of the existing framework of environmental protection during wartime -
namely that this protection is not geared to protecting the environment per se,
but, rather, humanity's need to make use of it. More troubling is that state
practice in some of the signatories to the Rome Statute ascribes the
anthropocentric limitation to the totality of the material element of Article
8(2)(b)(iv). For example, the German Military Manual states that:
"'Widespread,' 'long-term,' and 'severe' damage to the natural environment is
a major interference with human life or natural resources. 48
An additional phrase that requires definition is "natural environment." In
its report detailing the work of its 43rd Session, the ILC offered a broad
definition of "natural environment. 4 9 This definition focused both on the
46. UN Doc. A/48/269, p. 9. See also JozefGoldblat, The Mitigation of Environmental Disruption
by War: Legal Approaches, in ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS OF WAR: RELEASING DANGEROUS FORCES IN AN
INDUSTRIALZED WORLD 52 (Arthur Westing ed. 1990). The ILC has concluded that Along-term" should be
taken to "mean the long-lasting nature of the effects and not the possibility that the damage would occur a
long time afterwards." See UN Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2241, 22 August 1991, pp. 15, 18, cited in Preparatory
Commission Request, supra note 39, at 33.
47. Lynn Berat, Defending tile Right to a Healthy Environment: Toward a Crime of Geocide in
International Law, I I B.U. INT'L L.J. 327, 347 n.102 (1993).
48. HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS MANUAL (GERMANY), No. 403, 37 (1992), cited
in Preparatory Commission Request, supra note 39, at 34. More broadly, the fact that the environmental war
crimes is clustered by the Working Group on the Elements of Crimes with provisions entirely focused on
damage to the human environment gives further credence to the concern that the delegates to the Preparatory
Commission may not see Article 8(2)(b)(iv) operating beyond these anthropocentric limitations. See
Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Second Session, 26 July to 13 August 1999,
<http://www.un.orglaw/icc/prepcpmni/prepjul.htm> (visited October 18, 1999) [Preparatory Commission
for the International Criminal Court, Second Session].
49. GAOR, 46th session, suppl. No. 10 (U.N. Doc. A/46/10), p. 276, cited in Preparatory
Commission Request, supra note 39, at 33.
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human environment as well as on the natural environment per se.50 Having
such a broad definition is necessary for Article 8(2)(b)(iv) to fully encompass
environmental security as opposed to only covering the protection of human
environments (e.g. cities, dwellings, private property) from destruction. The
ILC definition of the "natural environment" is as follows:
The words "natural environment" should be taken broadly to cover
the environment of the human race and where the human race
develops, as well as areas the preservation of which is of
fundamental importance in protecting the environment. These words
therefore cover the seas, the atmosphere, climate, forests and other
plant cover, fauna, flora and other biological elements."'
It will be important to develop a memorandum of understanding under the
Rome Statute in which the scope of "natural environment," "widespread,"
"long-term," and "severe" is spelled out. The ongoing Preparatory Commis-
sion sessions provide an appropriate forum for such discussions. In fact, the
Preparatory Commission intends to "ensure the formulation of generally
acceptable elements of crimes on Article 8, as part of a complete set of
elements of crimes for all crimes, laid down in the [Rome] Statute."52
Unfortunately, thus far specific discussion of the environmental war crime
provision has been very limited. 3 Nonetheless, it is essential to the viability of
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Second Session, supra note
49.
53. The Working Group on the Elements of Crimes regularly meets during the Preparatory
Commission sessions. See id. So far, it has considered the elements of some of the war crimes enumerated
in the Rome Statute. It has divided the war crimes provisions into nine clusters based on "the possible
commonality of their elements." Id. Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) is clustered with arts. 8(2)(b)(v) [attacking or
bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which
are not military objectives], (ix) [intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion,
education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and
wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives], and (xxiv) [intentionally directing attacks
against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the
Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law]. Id. So far, several discussion papers have been
proposed by the Working Group on the Elements of Crimes. No discussion paper has been prepared for
Article 8(2)(b)(iv). Id. The official website for the Preparatory Commission addresses this gap in the
following manner: "there was not sufficient time for the Coordinator to prepare discussion papers on the
elements of all the provisions of war crimes." Id. Of the 23 national government proposals submitted to the
Working Group on Elements of Crimes, only a handful made mention of Article 8(2)(b)(iv). See Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, List of documents issued at the second session of the Preparatory
Commission, <http://www.un.orglaw/icc/prepcomm/ gtdocs2nd.htm> (visited October 19, 1999). Only one
of these proposals gave thorough treatment to Article 8(2)(b)(iv). See Preparatory Commission Request,
supra note 39. There is no indication this trend will change in upcoming Preparatory Commission sessions.
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) that the definition of the elements it contains is not pitched
at such a high level so as to strip the provision of any practical effect. This may
well require the threshold of responsibility to be relaxed from the international
community's current understanding of the meaning of "widespread," "long-
term," and "severe" harm.
B. Exculpatory Effects of Military Advantage
Even if there is proof of widespread, long-term and severe damage to the
natural environment, liability is only found if this damage is "clearly excessive"
in relation to the "concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated."
This second material element permits "military objectives [to be] offered
as a defense against charges of environmental damage, even intentional
damage, as long as that damage is outweighed by the expected military gain."54
The exculpating force of "proof of military advantage" traces its roots to the
doctrine of "military necessity." This doctrine has historically been used to
mitigate or eliminate responsibility often for grievous breaches of humanitarian
standards. In short, "military necessity" is a principle of customary
international law5 "which 'authorizes' military action when such action is
necessary for the overall resolution of a conflict, particularly when the
continued existence of the acting state would otherwise be in jeopardy."56 At
the Nuremberg trials, the doctrine of military necessity was applied to the
destruction of property (the closest the international community has yet come
to an environmental war crimes proceeding) in the following manner:
The destruction of property to be lawful must be imperatively
demanded by the necessities of war. Destruction as an end in itself
is a violation of international law. There must be some reasonable
connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming
of the enemy forces. 7
"Military advantage" may bear an even lower threshold of proof than
"military necessity." As a result, the prohibition in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) may be
narrower than its antecedents at customary international law. In the case of
The fact that little individualized attention is given to the environmental war crimes provision
notwithstanding its fundamentally different nature than the other war crimes may foreshadow the possibility
that the environmental war crime is simply not taken particularly seriously within the spectrum of offenses
contained within the Rome Statute.
54. Austin and Bruch, supra note 15, at 39.
55. See Preparatory Commission Request, supra note 39, at 28, nn. 32-33.
56. Mark J.T. Caggiano, The Legitimacy of Environmental Destruction in Modem Warfare:
Customary Substance over Conventional Form, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479,496 (1993).
57. The Hostage Case, supra note 26, 11 T.W.C. at 1254.
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Article 8(2)(b)(iv), the ambit of "military advantage" is limited by the fact that
only "concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated" can justify the
environmental damage. Nonetheless, "concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated" still seems easier to prove than "military necessity." In
addition, although the "military necessity" defense may in fact form part of
customary international law, it is noteworthy that Protocol I, in its prohibition
of "widespread, long-term and severe" harm, did not permit proof of any
military advantage or necessity to eliminate wrongdoing. 58 As a result, Article
8(2)(b)(iv)'s prohibition is but a diluted version of that in Protocol I.
There are other concerns with "military advantage" in Article 8(2)(b)(iv).
First, although a "proportionality test" (i.e. the environmental damage must be
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage) is established, no guidelines, definitions or examples of "clearly
excessive" are provided. In fact, "the addition of the word[ ] 'clearly' ... in the
definition of collateral damage is not reflected in any existing legal source."5 9
To this end, memoranda of understanding of the Parties to the Rome Statute or
initial decisions by the ICC will be important in setting the scope for "clearly"
excessive.
Second, the factual element of the proportionality test is also unclear: since
proof of "clearly excessive" is required in order to find someone guilty, and
since the burden of proof rests with the Prosecutor, what type of research and
data will have to be marshaled? In addition, adjectival terms such as "concrete"
and "direct" and "overall" military advantage are somewhat vague and have not
yet been comprehensively defined by international law. Nor does the Rome
Statute provide more particularized definitions of the meaning of these terms.
As for "overall," the ICRC has suggested that it indicates "that a particular
target can have an important military advantage that can be felt over a lengthy
period of time and affect military action in areas other than the vicinity of the
target itself."'6 In the end, the extent to which these adjectives qualify or
extend the exculpating effect of military advantage will bear heavily on the
ability of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) to punish environmental crimes.
58. See Protocol 1, supra note 39, at arts. 35, 55. See also Richards and Schmitt, supra note 6, at
1062 ("No other considerations, such as the military advantage offered by the prohibited act, the possibility
that alternative operations will result in greater incidental injury to civilians or collateral damage to civilian
property, or the overall impact of the action in context, can trump the principle of environmental protection").
Protocol I did use the military advantage limitation for other violations (e.g., the safety of civilians). See
Protocol 1, supra note 39, at arts. 51, 52, 57. As a result, interpretive assistance of the meaning of "military
advantage" in the Rome Statute can flow from the use of the term "military advantage" in Protocol 1. Any
such assistance is, of course, limited by the fact that "military advantage" in Protocol I does not figure into
its treatment of the environmental war crime.
59. See Preparatory Commission Request, supra note 39, at 29.
60. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/INF/10 (July 13, 1998).
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Finally, the military advantage needs simply to be "anticipated." What
does this term signify? Some clarification as to the meaning of "anticipated"
can emerge from a consideration of state declarations made to the use of
"military advantage" in prior international conventions. It is reported that:
A number of [s]tates expressed their understanding that the military
advantage anticipated from an attack is intended to refer to the
advantage anticipated from the attack considered as a whole and not
from isolated or particular parts of the attack.6
On a related note, it is unclear by whom and according to what standards
the "anticipation" is to be judged. Does there have to be an objective element
to the anticipation, or can the belief be subjectively held yet unrealistic? If the
notion of military advantage remains subjective in the mind of the military or
political leader under the circumstances in which the tactical decision was
made, then the defense could be too widely available. In order to curtail misuse
of the defense, it will be important to establish some objective standards as to
when the military advantage of an attack may justify widespread, long-term,
and severe damage to the environment.
The difficulties which inhere in giving appropriate meaning to the defense
of military advantage raise more penetrating questions. These questions
militate in favor of reconsidering the interaction between international
environmental law and international humanitarian law. Certain practices - such
as genocide and torture - have been sanctioned as illegal by the international
community to the extent that they can never be undertaken even if essential to
defend national sovereignty. Why should intentional environmental desecration
not be similarly proscribed?
C. The Mental Element: Strict Intentionality
In the case of Article 8(2)(b)(iv), criminal sanction will only fall upon an
individual who knows his or her behavior will cause widespread, long-term, and
severe damage to the environment which is clearly excessive in relation to the
overall military advantage anticipated and, notwithstanding proof of this
knowledge, still commits the act with the full intention of causing the
environmental damage. More concisely, the perpetrator must be found to have
61. Preparatory Commission Request, supra note 39, at 30. This is the position taken by the
governments of Belgium, Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom in regard
to Protocol I. Australia and New Zealand have declared that military advantage anticipated refers to the
Abona fide expectation that the attack will make a relevant and proportional contribution to the objective of
the military attack involved." Id. Commentators have also linked the military advantage of the specific attack
in question to the purposes of the military operation taken as a whole. id. at 31.
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acted willfully and in the knowledge that the attack will cause the prohibited
environmental damage.62 The Rome Statute therefore "presupposes that the
attack was launched in the knowledge that [the] consequences listed occur. 6 3
The ICRC has interpreted the phrase "in the knowledge" as requiring "the
person committing the act [to know] with certainty that the described results
would ensue, and this would not cover recklessness."' The fact that there is no
liability for negligently or carelessly inflicting widespread, long-term, and
severe damage to the environment means that persons who are found to act
negligently will not face any sanction at all. The provision therefore covers
only the most invidious offender. It goes without saying that proving this very
onerous intentionality requirement will not be easy.
As a result, a more proactive approach may be required. Military and
political officials in both developing and developed nations should be educated
on the environmentally harmful effects of certain types of warfare, and be
informed of the technologies to avoid reliance on such strategies in the first
place. In this regard, the work of the ICRC can play a pivotal role. The ICRC
has published a document entitled Guidelines for Military Manuals and
Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in Times ofArmed Conflict
(Guidelines), which are:
Intended as a tool to facilitate the instruction and training of armed
forces in an often neglected area of international humanitarian law:
the protection of the natural environment. The Guidelines['] ... sole
aim is to contribute in a practical and effective way to raising
awareness... [T]hey are an instrument for dissemination purposes.'
The Guidelines state that they are drawn from existing international legal
obligations and, as such, constitute a baseline ofjus commune among nations.66
62. Id. at 27.
63. Id. at 34.
64. Zimmermann, in COMMENTARY ON THE ADDMONAL PROTOCOL 1, art. 85, No. 3479, at 996,
cited in Preparatory Commission Request, supra note 39, at 34.
65. Follow-up to the International Conference for the Protection of War Victims, Guidelines for
Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict,
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS, No. 311, 230-237 (March 1, 1996); published as an annex to
U.N. Doc. A/49/323 (1994) <http://www.icrc.org/unicc/icrcnews.nsf/8> [Guidelines]. The United Nations
General Assembly invited all states to widely disseminate these Guidelines and to give due consideration to
the possibility of incorporating them into their military manuals. See GA Res. 49/50 (Dec. 9, 1994), art. 11.
See also SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT SEA (Louise
Doswald-Beck, ed.) (Cambridge University Press, 1995) for a restatement of the law applicable to armed
conflicts at sea. Many of the principles in the San Remo Manual are encapsulated in the general provisions
of the Guidelines.
66. Guidelines, supra note 65, at art. I(1).
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Many detailed rules are provided in Article 111(9) of the Guidelines, which
cover numerous issues ranging from barring incendiary weapons in forested
regions to precluding the use of naval mines. Ultimately, it is hoped that the
Guidelines could constitute the specific level of objective knowledge imputed
to all military and civilian leaders and agents for purposes of culpability under
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute. It is also hoped that they will be taken
into account as new weaponry is developed. In this latter regard, Article 1V(18)
of the Guidelines is particularly important:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon,
means or method of warfare, states are under an obligation to
determine whether its employment would, in some or all
circumstances, be prohibited by applicable rules of international law,
including those providing protection of the environment in times of
armed conflict.67
In conclusion, unless some level of objective knowledge is read into the
intentionality requirement, individuals who choose not to inform themselves
that what they are doing is destructive of the environment might be able to use
their ignorance as a full defense. A failure to incorporate an objective element
into the Rome Statute's environmental war crimes also represents a step
backwards insofar as Protocol I had, as early as 1977, grounded responsibility
not in intentional environmental harm, but simply when there was a reasonable
expectation that environmental damage would occur.6"
IV. IS IT WORTH GREENING THE ICC?
International lawyers need to consider whether the interests of the global
environment are in fact well-served by collapsing environmental crimes within
an overarching multilateral mechanism. If so, then an important subsidiary
question emerges: is the ICC the appropriate mechanism or should a new
environmentally specific entity be created? The most immediate countervail-
ing option to proceeding multilaterally would be to address environmental
crimes within the rubric of independently negotiated regional agreements. In
such cases, domestic courts, regional tribunals, or either domestic or regional
regulatory agencies could serve as enforcement mechanisms.
Efforts at the regional level may prove effective in combating
environmental crimes within and outside the context of armed conflict. By way
67. Id. at art. IV(18).
68. Background Paper, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES
(June 10-12, 1998) 5; See also Preparatory Commission Request, supra note 39, at 34.
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of example, in March, 1999, six African countries established an "African
Interpol" to fight wildlife crime. 9 More sweeping is the Council of Europe's
Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law.7 °
The motivation behind the Convention is that signatories should take effective
measures to ensure that the perpetrators of environmental hazards having
serious consequences escape neither prosecution nor punishment.7' This
Convention obliges signatories to criminalize certain intentional or negligent
forms of environmental offenses (although the negligence may be limited by
declaration to acts of gross negligence only).72 Specific examples are provided.
For instance, the intentional discharge of ionizing radiation into the air, soil, or
water which causes a "significant risk" of death or serious injury is to be
prohibited.73 So, too, is the unlawful disposal or transport of hazardous waste
which causes or is likely to cause death, serious injury, or "substantial damage
to the quality of air, soil, water, animals, or plants."74 This latter provision is
important for it goes beyond the anthropocentric approach to assessing
environmental harm which often characterizes current conventions and laws.
However, these successful regional initiatives should not obscure the
importance of multilateral efforts. The two levels can in fact operate
contemporaneously. As for the ICC, in order for it to capture environmental
crimes outside of the context of war, its jurisdiction would have to be
broadened. In this vein, some commentators have suggested making it a crime
recklessly or intentionally to harm the environment." This could permit the
behavior of armed forces not engaged in hostilities to be regulated, together
with corporations and governments who may implement policies which
promote insecurity through environmental modification. This crime has been
named "geocide" or "ecocide." Literally, this constitutes the environmental
counterpart of genocide - a killing of the earth. The logic of ecocide is as
69. IRIN News Update (March 18, 1999). The countries are: Democratic Republic of Congo,
Kenya, Lesotho, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia. The headquarters of the African Interpol will be in Nairobi,
Kenya. Negotiators indicated that the arrangement was required owing to the need for international
cooperation to fight wildlife crimes successfully." Id.
70. Council of Europe, Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law,
ETS No. 172 (November 4, 1998).
71. Id. at pmbl.
72. Id. at arts. 2, 3.
73. Id. at art. 2.
74. Id.
75. This crime would operate within and outside the context of war. See, e.g., Richard A. Falk,
Environmental Disruption by Military Means and International Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE: A
TECHNICAL, LEGAL AND POLICY APPRAISAL 33-51 (1984); Jesica E. Seacor, Environmental Terrorism:
Lessons from the Oil Fires of Kuwait, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 481 (1994); Mark Allan Gray, The
International Crime of Ecocide, 26 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 215 (1996); Berat, supra note 48; Caggiano, supra
note 57; Yuzon, supra note 26.
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follows: significantly harming the natural environment constitutes a breach of
a duty of care, and this breach consists, in the least, in tortuous or delictual
conduct and, when undertaken with willfulness, recklessness or negligence,
ought to constitute a crime.76
Although some international environmental lawyers may find the
criminalization of ecocide to be intellectually attractive, it seems fair to say that
its chances of being negotiated into the jurisdiction of the ICC are slim at best.
And yet environmental crimes outside armed conflict do occur and, when they
do, certainly inflict "widespread, long-term, and severe" damage to the natural
environment. Examples of such crimes could include reckless misconduct at
nuclear power facilities," testing of biological weapons, or intentional dumping
of oil and chemical wastes from ships (often cruise ships) at sea.7" Trade in
endangered species, hazardous wastes and ozone-depleting substances
constitutes an underground market estimated at $U.S. 20 billion annually.79
Another particularly troubling example of what is arguably an environmental
crime which is essentially unregulated at the international level notwithstanding
its transnational effects is the setting of forest fires in the Amazon basin and in
Indonesia. In both cases, there is compelling evidence that these fires had been
deliberately set by businesses seeking to clear the forests for economic
development.80
76. See Mark A. Drumbl, Waging War Against the World: The Need to Move From War Crimes
to Environmental Crimes, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 122, 142 (1998).
77. A case in point could be the 1986 meltdown at the Chernobyl plant in the former Soviet Union.
See Berat, supra note 48, at 345 (There is substantial evidence that although Soviet scientists and
governmental officials were aware that the Soviet nuclear power plant design was flawed and had the
potential for causing unmitigated disaster, they persisted in maintaining old plants and built new ones without
design modification.).
78. See Douglas Frantz, Sovereign Islands: Gaps in Sea Laws Shield Pollution by Cruise Lines,
N.Y. TIMES, January 3, 1999, at Al. (documenting pollution activities by the Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines,
proof of which induced United States courts to order a $9 million fine and a promise that the dumping
practices would cease); See Matthew L. Wald, Cruise Line Pleads Guilty to Dumping of Chemicals, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 1999, (documenting further pollution activity by Royal Caribbean after the original fine,
which lead to a guilty plea to an additional $18 million fine). Although United States authorities were
ultimately successful in asserting jurisdiction over the cruise ships and subjecting them to United States law,
this was not an easy process. "The ships fly foreign flags and the parent companies are registered in foreign
countries, often putting them outside the reach of the authorities in this country." See Wald, supra note 79.
79. Eight Countries Agree to Fight Environmental Crime, N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 1998, at A4.
80. John Klotz, 20:12 NATIONAL L.J., (November 17, 1997) at A 18 (col. 3). For the Indonesian
context alone, see Randy Lee Loftis, The Tropics Are on Fire, TORONTO STAR, June 6, 1998, at C6
("evidence shows that settlers were being paid by large corporations to bum forests to convert land into
corporate-owned palm or rice plantations"). "The Indonesian Environmental Forum estimates that at least
two million hectares of forests and other land were burned in 1997." See ORAN R. YOUNC, INSITUTIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: SCIENCE PLAN 31 (1999). The effects on the
environment are clear: immediate destruction, an inability of ecosystem regeneration, as well as contribution
to global warming. In the end, this destruction comes full circle to affect humanity: through death and
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Nonetheless, even if negotiators had the willingness and succeeded in
according the ICC jurisdiction over ecocide as a "most serious crime[ ] of
concern to the international community as a whole,"'" uncertainty would linger
as to the ICC's effectiveness in terms of being able or suited to enforce such a
prohibition. As a result, collapsing environmental crimes within the ICC might
not be the most effective way to sanction such crimes. This Article identifies
five reasons why this might be so: (1) environmental crimes may become lost
amid the hurly-burly of the ICC's activities; (2) ICC personnel may have low
environmental expertise and there may consequently be very high transaction
costs involved in "getting up to speed" on environmental issues; (3) the
sanctions which the ICC can order are not appropriate to correcting
environmental desecration; (4) there is limited scope under the Rome Statute
to integrate preexisting international law in the area of environmental crimes;
and (5) environmental harm may well be best deterred by a negligence standard
which is essentially incompatible with the mandate of a permanent international
court designed to punish the most serious crimes of concern to humanity. This
Article will now consider each of these in turn.
A. Environmental Concerns Lost in the Shuffle
Clearly, one of the major successes of the Rome Statute is that it creates
an institution to actually punish the conduct it prohibits. Nonetheless, from the
environmental point of view, the extent to which "environmental crimes" will
receive the ICC's attention is uncertain given the broad array of other crimes
to which it will have to direct its energies. The environmental war crime
constitutes only one provision out of dozens in Part 2 of the Rome Statute. And
A[t]his provision has largely escaped notice amid the larger debate about the
creation of the court and the scope of its jurisdiction." 2 Article 8(2)(b)(iv)
remains peripheral to the ongoing discussions of the Working Group on the
Elements of Crimes held at the Preparatory Commission sessions.8 3 As a result,
there is no indication that, as work on the establishment of the ICC progresses,
the environmental war crime will be able to attract the attention it requires in
order to be effectively implemented.
disability owing to the effects of asthma and smog-related illnesses, and, in the case of the Indonesian fires,
creating smoke and haze which may have induced a plane crash in Sumatra which took the lives of 234
people. See Loftis, supra note 81.
81. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 5(1).
82. Austin and Bruch, supra note 15, at 32.
83. See Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Second Session, supra note
49; See also supra note 54.
B. Low Environmental Expertise of the Judges and Prosecutors
Judges and prosecutors on the ICC will likely not have expertise in the
area of environmental law, policy or science. This can heighten the transaction
costs of proceeding judicially,84 as well as produce ineffective jurisprudence.
Were environmental crimes to be litigated in a separate forum or before a
specialized agency, there could be a greater guarantee of some level of
scientific expertise.
C. Inappropriate Sanctions
Part 7 of the Rome Statute offers the most contemporary compilation of
the international community's thinking on how international crimes ought to be
punished. The punishment provisions of the Rome Statute contain two
limitations on the effectiveness of Article 8(2)(b)(iv).
First, the jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to natural persons. This makes
it impossible to find any institutional or state liability should it be difficult to
prove that the actions of one or some individuals accounted for the
environmental desecration. This is unlike the Council of Europe's Convention
on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law, Article 9 of
which establishes jurisdiction over corporate offenders together with natural
persons.8 5
Second, sentencing is limited to imprisonment, fines, and forfeiture of the
proceeds of the crime. 6 There does not appear to be much room to compel
restitution, remediation of blight, establish civil liability or, simply put, to clean
84. For example, in the recent International Court of Justice's decision in Case Concerning the
Gabcikovo-Nagymnaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Sept. 25, 1997, No. 92 General List, <http://www.icj-
cij.org/idocket/ihs/ihsjudgementlihsjudcontent.html>), the judges had to be educated in the environmental
science aspects of the dispute. Although there is much to be gained from educating lay people on
environmental issues, this can involve significant time as well as financial costs. A specialized tribunal could
avoid some of these. Making mention of the International Court of Justice begs the question whether it could
serve as an adjudicator of environmental crimes. In the past, the International Court of Justice has had limited
experience with environmental matters, although it has taken some very important decisions, such as the
•Nuclear Tests Cases (Australia v. France) 1974 I.C.J. 253; Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua: (Nicaragua v. United States) 1986 I.C.J. 16; and most recently in Fisheries Jurisdiction Case
(Spain v. Canada) (Dec. 4, 1998). It has also recently created an Environmental Chamber with a view to
playing a more proactive role in resolving environmental disputes. Nonetheless, the impediments to the
effectiveness of the International Court of Justice to adjudicating environmental crimes are significant: (1)
the requirement that both litigants consent to thejurisdiction of the court, which is impractical in any criminal
context where it is inexorable that one litigant will unwillingly be dragged into court; and (2) there is simply
no jurisdiction to hear disputes involving individuals or non-natural legal persons.
85. Council of Europe, Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law,
supra note 71.
86. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 77.
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up the environmental harm. This is again unlike the Council of Europe's
Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law,
Article 6 of which provides that sanctions include imprisonment, fines, as well
as reinstatement of the environment.87 This is also unlike the UNCC's ap-
proach to remedying environmental crimes committed during the Gulf War.88
Nor does the ICC have injunctive powers to stop violations from occurring.
Without the ICC being able to order restorative or injunctive remedies, the
curative nature of the punishment for causing "widespread, long-term, and
severe" damage to the natural environment is limited at best. It is true that the
Rome Statute permits fines and assets collected to be transferred to a Trust
Fund for the benefit of victims of the crime.89 Access to this Trust Fund is
provided for in Article 75, which permits the ICC to make an order specifying
reparations to victims for purposes of restitution, compensation, and
rehabilitation. However, the Trust Fund does not address a situation where it
is the natural environment directly, and humanity only indirectly, which bears
the burden of the damage. In addition, the magnitude of wartime environmental
harm may be so vast that resources transferred from individual defendants
simply cannot go very far in terms of remedying that harm. By way of ex-
ample, in the Gulf War alone Kuwait's environmental claims filed with the
UNCC total over $15 billion.' Another concern is that "to the extent that
charges of environmental war crimes are ancillary to other serious charges, the
concern for using the trust fund to aid human victims doubtless will take
priority over addressing environmental harms."'" This, once again, returns us
to the problem of pursuing environmental goals in a regime principally
designed to address genocide, persecution, and murder.
As a result, there is cause for concern that environmental crimes will not
only be poorly cognizable under the ICC, but also that the punishment for
wrongdoing will not address the unique nature of these crimes.
87. Council of Europe, Convention on the Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law,
supra note 71.
88. See supra note 14. The UNCC is only beginning to turn to the environmental claims which have
been filed. Nonetheless, initial decisions by the UNCC in other areas may reveal limitations on its
effectiveness to assess compensation for environmental harms. For example, in its decision on contractual
claims issued on July 1, 1998, the UNCC limited many of the asserted losses on the basis that the claimants
had not established a sufficiently direct causal link to Iraqi aggression: more particularly, the UNCC required
"specific proof that the failure to perform was the direct result of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait."
See Austin and Bruch, supra note 15, at 32, 35. In the end, the contractual claimants received less than one-
tenth of the damages they had asserted. Id. at 32. Rigorous requirements of causality and directness of
damage may make it difficult for environmental and public health claims to succeed.
89. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 79.
90. Austin and Bruch, supra note 15, at 33.
91. Id. at 39.
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D. Limited Scope of Judicial Interpretation
The list of enumerated war crimes under Article 8(2)(b) appears to be
exhaustive. After all, the use of the term "namely" implies that the ICC is not
to have jurisdiction over serious violations of the laws and customs of war
which are not listed in Article 8(2)(b). There is thus little opportunity for
judicial interpretation to reach beyond the enumerated environmental war
crime. To this end, it might be difficult for the ICC to use Article 2192 to
incorporate in its jurisdiction the very small number of international legal
materials which may provide more proactive sanction of environmental war
crimes than that found in Article 8(2)(b)(iv).93 This constitutes further evi-
92. Rome Statute, supra note 1, at art. 21(1), which states that the Court shall apply: (a) In the first
place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence; (b) In the second place,
where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the
established principles of the international law of armed conflict.
93. In addition to the ENMOD Convention and Protocol I, these fragments include the International
Law Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility (provides that an international crime may result from,
inter alia, a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safe-guarding and
preservation of the human environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or
of the seas). See INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S DRAFT ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILTY, art.
19(3)(d) (Shabtai Rosenne ed., 199 1). This is one of the few international legal documents prior to the Rome
Statute which demonstrated a willingness to criminalize environmental degradation. The International Law
Commission Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind recognizes as "war crimes:"
(i) extensive destruction ... of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly; (ii) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;
(iii) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; and (iv)
in the case of armed conflict, using methods or means of warfare not justified by military necessity with the
intent to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment and thereby gravely
prejudice the health or survival of the population and such damage occurs. See INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION DRAFT CODE OF CRIMES AGAINSTTHE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND, art. 20, G.A. Res.
97, U.N. GAOR, 33d Sess., Supp. No. 45, at 220, U.N. Doc. A/33/45 (1978); amended by G.A. Res. 151,
U.N. GAOR, 42d sess., Supp. No. 49, at 292, U.N. Doc. A/42/49 (1987). Some of these crimes were
incorporated into the Rome Statute. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note I, at arts. 8(2)(a)(iv), 8(2)(b)(xvii),
8(2)(b)(xviii), 8(2)(b)(xx). The 1907 Hague Regulations deem it prohibited to destroy or seize the enemy's
property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. See
Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to the Convention Respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 23(g), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277. Although not explicitly
mentioned, the natural environment can be considered to constitute "property;" however, it is unclear whether
the natural environment within the global commons would fall within the notion of "property" since it is
neither privately nor nationally owned. For a review of other internationally negotiated provisions which
might provide ancillary protection to the environment during wartime, see Richards and Schmitt, supra note
7, at 1067-73. There are also some soft law agreements which may inform the content of international
standards. See World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7 U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., 48th plen. mtg. (1982),
Principle 5 ("Nature shall be secured against degradation caused by warfare or other hostile activities."). See
also Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/5Rev. 1, reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 874 (1992), Principle 24 ("Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall
therefore respect international law providing protection for the environment in times of armed conflict and
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dence of the limited ability of the ICC to accommodate environmental
protection concerns. After all, without the flexibility to go beyond the words
of the Rome Statute notwithstanding developments in international
environmental law, the ICC may not be able to do justice to any such
developments.
E. No Room for Negligence or Recklessness
The ICC is designed to deter criminal behavior. Unlike direct humanitar-
ian abuses, environmental crimes during warfare may often involve conduct
which tends more to the negligent, reckless, or willfully blind than to the
intentional. Intention is always difficult to prove. So, too, is causation.
Consequently, in order for the ICC to remain within its present mandate it will
have to let go all but the most flagrant incidents of deliberate environmental
desecration.
As a result, some of the recommendations suggested in this Article to
enhance the effectiveness of Article 8(2)(b)(iv) may simply not be able to be
accommodated by the present mandate of the ICC. 4 Two commentators have
offered the following well-placed remarks regarding two of these
recommendations:
[I]t is difficult to imagine how the [ICC] could relax both the
threshold of damage and the intent requirement while remaining
within its existing mandate. The countries that acceded to the Rome
Statute simply could not have intended to let their military officers be
prosecuted for any action, committed with any state of mind, that
causes any environmental damage.9"
If only the most egregious form of environmental insecurity has been
caught by the ICC, does this augur well for the future promotion of
environmental security within the structures of international criminal or
humanitarian law? In the end, these structures may only be able to address
environmental insecurity in a very limited fashion. The question thus arises
cooperate in its further development, as necessary."). See also U.N. General Assembly Resolution on the
Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, G.A. Res. 47/37 (November 25, 1992)
(environmental considerations constitute one of the elements to be taken into account in the implementation
of the principles of the law applicable in armed conflict). The International Court of Justice has ruled that
states "must take environmental considerations into account when assessing what is necessary and
proportionate in the pursuit of legitimate military objectives." See International Court of Justice, Legality
of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, Advisory Opinion (July 8, 1996), at 30.
94. See also Drumbl, supra note 77, at 129-30, 133 (provides a more detailed discussion of these
recommendations).
95. Austin and Bruch, supra note 15, at 39.
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whether encouraging remediation as a "punishment" (instead of individual
imprisonment, fines, and the resultant stigmatization) might bring more nations
on board in terms of sanctioning less egregious (yet, when aggregated, likely
more destructive) forms of environmental destruction during armed conflict.
If so, then an organization supervising a strict liability regime supplemented by
a remediation fund might be a preferable institutional device. Such an
organization could be established on a regional or ad hoc basis (such as the
UNCC). On the other hand, such an institution may be capable of development
as a permanent multilateral entity which could minister to the remediation of
global environmental harm. If the fund were to operate on an "at-fault" basis,
then it could be financed by the international community yet retain subrogation
rights against perpetrators of environmental harm. If the remediation fund were
to operate on a "no-fault" basis, it could be capitalized by international
contributions assessed by the size and nature of a nation's armed forces
(reflecting the capacity of those forces to create environmental harms).'
Capitalization can also be sought from the private sector, namely
manufacturers of weapons. In this latter regard, the International Fund for the
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage can serve as a precedent, as it is in part
capitalized by "fees imposed on oil transported on the high seas, and
supplemented by contributions from tanker owners, oil producers, refiners, and
marketers."97 In the least, such funds can assist immediate mitigation efforts
which will usually reduce the long-term costs of remediation. In this latter
regard, Austin and Bruch recommend the creation of an "emergency response
task force" which would be financed by the fund and could spearhead initial
mitigation efforts."
V. PUNITIVE SANCTION, PROACTIVE PROTECTION, OR
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE?
A more fundamental question lurks beneath any evaluation of the ICC as
a mechanism to promote environmental security. Essentially, the ICC
represents a punitive, retributive justice paradigm in which certain serious
crimes against the international community are to be redressed through the
prosecution and imprisonment of selected individuals. The foundational
question for international environmental lawyers is whether a punitive
methodology will actually promote environmental security.
96. Id. at 41.
97. Environmental funds in the United States have also been proffered as potential precedents.
These include Superfund, the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund, the
Leaking Underground Storage Tank Trust Fund, and the Black Lung Disability Trust Fund. Id.
98. Id. at 42.
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It is clear that considerable symbolic and precedential value can emerge
from the criminal punishment of invidious perpetrators of intentional
environmental desecration. However, what about the practical effect? Cases of
intentional environmental destruction do not, when aggregated, constitute the
most significant source of harm to the environment. Since the ICC can only
capture the intentional infliction of environmental harm, it leaves undeterred the
activities which cause the greatest amount of environmental harm - negligent
or reckless conduct. As a result, the question arises whether a greater level of
deterrence can be achieved through preventative measures as opposed to the
threat of criminal punishment. This is a question that environmental advocates
at the domestic level have long considered. At the domestic level, there has
been much discussion regarding the limits of punitive ex post punishment as a
device to promote environmentally respectful behavior. Many advocates pre-
fer a focus on including as policy devices incentive-based regulation and
proactive ex ante prevention. Is there any reason why such a methodology
might not prove beneficial at the international level?
Implementing this second approach - proactive protection - will entail
linkages beyond the legal context. Examples include the creation of economic
disincentives to producing environmentally destructive weaponry, technology
transfers to assist developing countries to pursue national security interests in
more of an environmentally friendly manner, and financial assistance
mechanisms, for example for the safe decommissioning of nuclear weapons.
Linkages to trade and investment should be developed so as to create
disincentives to export and sell the more environmentally injurious military
technology. One final linkage which is of considerable importance involves
international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement forces. These could be
mandated to ensure environmental, along with humanitarian, protection.
Allotting these international forces a "green-keeping" mandate could help
integrate international environmental norms into internecine conflict. By way
of example, were United Nations involvement in Somalia to have had a "green-
keeping" mandate, then practices of deforestation and assaults on water purity -
which were commonplace in the conflict - could have been much better
addressed. Ultimately, the prevention of environmental crime cannot be
disaggregated from the fact that environmental scarcity and resource depletion
are often the cause of military conflict.9 As a result, equipping nations
(through technology transfers, transparency of information or financial
99. By way of example, the Rwandan conflict was partly precipitated by demand for arable land.
Over the past three decades, average farm size has declined from two hectares per family to 0.7 hectares. On
the relationship between agricultural land-use and the Rwandan genocide. See Guenthar Baechler, Rwanda:
The Roots of Tragedy, Battle for Elimination on an Ethno-political and Ecological Basis, in
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AS A CAUSE OF WAR, VOLUME II, 461-502 (1996).
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assistance) to engage in proper environmental management and sustainable
development could have the collateral benefit of mitigating military aggression.
A relatively new wave of litigation in the United States reveals a third
approach to attaining environmental security: environmental justice claims
under the United States Constitution" or under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act. '' These claims meld environmental protection and civil rights. The nub
of these claims stems from the factual observation that "environmental
degradation often has a distinctly racist aspect."'0 2 More specifically:
[Rieports generally indicate that people with relatively low incomes
and/or people of color are more likely to have hazardous waste
treatment facilities sited in their neighborhoods than are members of
the population in general. [Miembers of politically less powerful
groups are exposed to greater risks from hazardous waste related
problems than the overall population of the United States, and are
thus disproportionately carrying certain environmental burdens of
modem society.'03
In response to this difficult situation, the environmental justice paradigm
attempts to create "equal protection from ecological hazards for all communi-
ties."' 4  Aggrieved parties have argued that the uneven distribution of
environmental burdens on disempowered minority groups infringes the Equal
Protection Clause. 05 Others have submitted that decisions to locate environ-
mental facilities in certain regions of the country evidence discrimination in the
expenditure of federal funds. 6 The argument has also been raised that
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations promulgated to implement
100. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV 1.
101. 42 U.S.C. 2000(d) (1994).
102. Anthony D. Taibi, Comment, Environmental Justice, Structural Theory, and Community
Economic Empowerment, 9 ST. JOHN'S J. 491,492 (1994).
103. Weintraub, supra note 4, at 568-69.
104. Lincoln L. Davies, Working Towards a Common Goal? Three Case Studies of Brownfields
Redevelopment in Environmental Justice Communities, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 285, 287 (1999). "[Llow-
income and minority communities bear the brunt of the industrialized world's environmental contamination
and are often the last groups to receive funding for cleanups." Id. at 288.
105. U.S. CONST. Amends. V, ("[n]o person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law;") XIV § I (applies to discriminatory actions taken by the states).
106. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title Vi, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d), 601 ("No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance").
See also Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)(l), 602 ("Each Federal department and
agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity... is authorized
and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000(d) of this title.., by issuing rules, regulations, or
orders of general applicability.").
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Title VI provide an enforceable cause of action should the exercise of the
EPA's authority to manage environmental policy subject individuals to
discrimination. 10
7
Environmental justice litigation has only had limited success. No court
has found a violation of the Equal Protection Clause."8 Courts have held that
Title VI prohibits intentional discrimination only. " Intentional discrimination,
as opposed to disparate impact, can be very difficult to prove in environmental
justice cases." 0 As for the claim alleging violation of the EPA regulation, some
courts have expressed doubt as to the existence of a private right of action to
enforce such a claim."' The highest profile environmental justice case thus far,
Seif v. Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living, involved a claim
brought under the EPA regulations."' The challenge was to the issuance of a
permit to construct and operate a waste treatment facility, more specifically a
soil incinerator. The factual underpinnings to this dispute are typical of many
environmental justice claims. Chester is a city of 42,000 inhabitants located in
Delaware County, Pennsylvania."' Although Delaware County's 500,000
residents are overwhelmingly white (91%), Chester's population is two-thirds
African-American." 'The complainants allege that five of Delaware County's
waste treatment facilities are located in Chester; the remaining two facilities are
located in predominantly white areas. 15 The fact that the state permitted the
107. Pursuant to Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VI, 42 U.S.C. 2000(d)(l), 602, the EPA adopted
regulations which state: "A recipient shall not use criteria or methods of administering its program which
have the effect if subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race, color, national origin, or sex."
See 40 C.F.R. 7.35(b). This prohibition would thus prevent intentional as well as disparate impact
discrimination.
108. See Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp.,482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979); Terry
Properties, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1523 (1 th Cir. 1986); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n
v. Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Commission, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989); R.I.S.E., Inc.
v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D. Va. 1991). The requirement to prove the defendant acted with
discriminatory intent has been a major stumbling-block for such claims. See Alice Kaswan, Environmental
Laws: Grist for the Equal Protection Mill, 70 U. CoLO. L REV. 387,432 (1999).
109. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983); New York City Environmental
Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, 50 F. Supp. 2d 250 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
110. See Bradford C. Mank, Is There a Private Cause ofAction Under EPA's Title VI Regulations?
The Need to Empower Environmental Justice Plaintiffs, 24 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L 1. 10-13 (1999).
111. New York City Environmental Justice Alliance v. Giuliani, supra note 110; South Bronx
Coalition for Clean Air, Inc. v. Conroy, 20 F. Supp. 2d 565 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
112. 944 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1996), rev'd 132 F.3d 9925 (3d Cir. 1997), vacated, No. 97-1620,
524 U.S. 974 (1998).
113. Id. at 927.
114. Id.
115. The two permits granted for white areas covered facilities with a combined waste capacity of
1,400 tons per year, whereas the five permits granted in African-American areas were for facilities with a
combined waste capacity of over 2,100,000 tons per year. Id.
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new treatment facility to be located in Chester notwithstanding this pre-existing
disproportionality1 6 prompted residents to sue the state, alleging "environ-
mental racism" in the administrative decisions to allocate permits. The District
Court dismissed the lawsuit." 7 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed,
finding the complainants entitled to an implicit private right of action under the
EPA regulations and thus permitting the claim to proceed."' On June 8, 1998,
the United States Supreme Court gave itself its first opportunity to consider
environmental justice by granting certiorari to review this dispute. 9 However,
on August 17, 1998, the Supreme Court dismissed its grant of certiorari,
vacated the Chester Residents judgment, and remanded the case back to the
Third Circuit with instructions to dismiss."n The vacatur was based on the fact
the dispute had become moot: on April 30, 1998, before the Supreme Court
granted certiorari, the soil incinerator permit expired and was revoked as the
applicant indicated it no longer planned to site a waste treatment facility in
Chester.' 2 ' The vacatur of the Third Circuit decision in Chester Residents
removes an important precedent to support environmental justice claims.
However, this vacatur does not mean that the Third Circuit decision is bad
law.' The Supreme Court has not yet spoken on this issue."n As a result, the
legal future of environmental justice claims in the United States may still carry
promise.2 In fact, notwithstanding the procedural hurdles inherent in having
an environmental justice claim heard by a court, the possibilities of facing an
environmental justice lawsuit have influenced government policy in the United
116. Id. at 415.
117. Id.
118. Chester Residents, 132 F.3d at 925.
119. Seif, 524 U.S. 915 (1998).
120. Id. at974 (1998).
121. Mank, supra note 111, at 50.. In situations where the underlying controversy is independently
removed, the normal practice of the Supreme Court is to vacate the decision under appeal. Id. at 51-2.
122. Recent decisions have affirmed the existence of a private right of action to challenge
administrative regulations on the grounds of disparate impact. See, e.g., Powell v. Ridge, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20092 (3rd Cir. 1999); Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175 (11 th Cir. 1999); Sandoval v.
Hagan, 7 F.Supp.2d 1234 (M.D. Ala. 1998).
123. One commentator has suggested that "[t]he Supreme Court seems likely to decide this vital
issue." See Mank, supra note 111, at 6. Nonetheless, "environmental justice plaintiffs may not rely on the
[Chester Residents] decision as precedent in the Third Circuit or even cite it as a'valid judgment in other
circuits." Id. at 51.
124. However, a recent decision of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals may dampen this promise.
See Goshen Road Environmental Action Team v. United States Department of Agriculture, 1999 WL 187264
(4th Cir. 1999) (siting a wastewater treatment facility in a predominantly African-American neighborhood
did not violate environmental justice policy concerns).
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States. 25 Concerns over lawsuits and fears regarding their perceived effects
have also affected the practice of environmental management.' 26
Might the fertile basis of internationally-negotiated anti-discrimination and
human rights conventions not provide solid ground for environmental justice
claims? Prohibitions against discrimination are found in the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, 27 the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, 28 and the International Convention on All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion. 29 Important regional agreements prohibiting discrimination are found in
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms 3' as well as the American Convention on Human Rights.' 3'
125. See Exec. Order No. 12,898,59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994). The Order provides that "each Federal
agency shall make achieving environmental justice part of its mission by identifying and addressing...
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and
activities on minority populations and low-income populations in the United States." Id. Agencies are
required to conduct programs which "substantially affect human health or the environment" so as not to
"subject[ I persons to discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin." Id. However, the Order
states that it is not intended to create a right ofjudicial review against the United States. Id.
126. By way of example, a "broad" civil rights investigation has been launched in response to claims
that the concentration of dozens of garbage transfer stations in the South Bronx discriminates against minority
residents. See Paul Zielbauer, Garbage Transfer Stations Face Civil Rights Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (March 7,
1999) at Al. More specifically, the investigation will "seek to determine whether dozens of garbage transfer
stations, and the hundreds of trucks that feed them, have spawned widespread respiratory and other health
problems that violate the civil rights of South Bronx residents, the vast majority of whom [n.b. 95%] are black
or Hispanic." Id. Similar investigations had previously been initiated in Michigan and Louisiana. Id.
127. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N. G.A. Res. 217 (Dec. 10, 1948), art. 7 ("All are
equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are
entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this declaration and against any
incitement to such discrimination.").
128. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (Dec. 16, 1966), art.
2 ("Each State Party ... undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status."), art. 26 ("All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the
equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.").
129. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 5 I.LM.
352 (1966), at arts. 2, 5 (State Parties guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, color,
or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law... in the enjoyment of the right to public health).
130. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 312
U.N.T.S. 221, as amended (Nov. 4,1950), art. 14 ("'he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property,
birth or other status.").
. 131. American Convention on Human Rights, 9 I.L.M. 673 (November 22, 1969), art. 24 ("All
persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection
of the law.").
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Notwithstanding the fact these conventions may permit international
environmental justice claims, thus far there has been very little literature
exploring the use of international human rights as a device to propound
environmental security. This is unfortunate since internationalizing environ-
mental justice recognizes that "environmental security may be ... a global idea,
only fully achievable as part of a universalization of environmental responsibil-
ity.' 32 For international lawyers, environmental justice may be attractive in
two types of situations: (1) the equal treatment of individuals within a state; and
(2) the equal treatment of individuals between states.
First, environmental justice can help combat "environmental cleansing"
the deliberate misuse of the natural environment as a tool to promote the
politics of racial, ethnic, or class hegemony within a nation-state.'33 Environ-
mental cleansing can deny individuals, groups and communities the "minimum
quality of environment' ' t34 needed to sustain ways of living or even lives and,
as such, further political goals such as forced relocation, subjugation,
assimilation, or internal colonialism. In this regard, the creation of environmen-
tal insecurity may well "reflect the governing body's discriminatory use of
power."'' 35 When the courts and legislatures of the nation-state in question offer
no recourse, individually enforceable remedies under international conventions
132. Weintraub, supra note 4, at 564.
133. See, e.g., Bill Weinberg, WAR ON THE LAND: ECOLOGY AND POLITICs IN CENTRAL AMERICA
76 (1991) ("[In Nicaragua] the rainforest was destroyed by campesinos who had been pushed from their land
to make way for the ecologically disastrous cotton industry, which relied heavily on pesticides and other
inputs. While all Central American countries became a dumping ground' for dangerous pesticides, which are
either restricted or banned in the countries where they are produced, Nicaragua also became a testing ground
for new experimental pesticides with the Nicaraguan citizenry serving as the guinea-pig" [emphasis in
original]). See also id. at 93; Ricardo A. Navarro, Environmental Impacts of the Civil War in El Salvador,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES (June 10-12,1998); Bernard Q.
Nietschmann, The Effects of War and Peace on Nicaragua's Environments, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL,
ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES (June 10-12, 1998) ("barrels of cyanide from gold mines were
dumped in rivers to kill fish eaten by rebel supporters"); Alvaro Josd Rodriguez, Environmental Impacts of
the Internal Armed Conflict in Colombia, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
ADDRESSING ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF WAR: LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES
(June 10-12, 1998) (discussing fumigation of agricultural lands where coca is allegedly grown, obliging
peasants to move into and clear-cut formerly pristine rainforest in order to cultivate subsistence crops). See
also supra, note 36 (on Colombia).
134. See Weintraub, supra note 4, at 542-53. The notion of environmental cleansing recognizes how
behavior directed against the environment can readily constitute a threat to the security of people,
demonstrating "the increasingly important role that environmental management plays in modern political
relationships." See id. at 536.
135. Id. at 564.
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or political pressure applied internationally may constitute the best available
options to redress the wrongs.
Second, environmental justice can address situations in which developing
countries and people of color disproportionately bear the environmental
externalities of the world's industrialization. One important example is the
export of hazardous waste from the developed world, where it is produced, to
the developing world, where it is to be disposed. 36  Although developing
countries may be paid to receive these wastes (often quite generously), they
often lack the technology to safely and adequately dispose of them upon
receipt; they may also lack the regulatory and scientific infrastructure to
supervise such disposal.' This then creates profound environmental insecurity
in local communities. One commentator has argued that "the shipment of
hazardous waste from developed to developing countries is environmental
racism on an international scale.' 3'  Although certain recently negotiated
conventions 39 provide disincentives to and in some cases even prohibit the
shipment of certain wastes from developed countries to developing countries,
the characterization of these shipments as infringing environmental justice
allows nations not signatories to these agreements to be held to similar
standards. Embedding the prohibition against such shipments in the discourse
136. See, e.g., Rozeia S. Park, An Examination of International Environmental Racism Through
the Lens of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 659 (1998);
Hugh J. Marbury, Hazardous Waste Exportation: The Global Manifestation of Environmental Racism, 28
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L 251 (1995).
137. See Park, supra note 137, at 668-70. As a result, the cost of disposal in these developing
countries for the polluter is much lower than it would be were the disposal to occur in a developed country.
See id. ("In 1989, in Africa, waste disposal costs were about forty dollars per ton. In contrast, the cost was
four to twenty-five times this amount in Europe and in the United States, twelve to thirty-six times greater.").
See also Marbury, supra note 137, at 257-58, 260 ("Given developing nations' inexperience in handling
hazardous waste and the large quantities of such waste generated each year, the possibility of a major
environmental disaster exists.").
138. Park, supra note 137, at 660. See also Marbury, supra note 137, at 291 ("Hazardous waste.
exporting is just environmental racism on a global scale. The main similarity between the two is who
shoulders the burden of living near and with the hazardous waste. Under each regime, the poor are forced
to shoulder a disproportionate amount of national and global burdens.").
139. Basel Convention on the Control ofTransboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, March 22, 1989,28 I.L.M. 657 (1989), amendedby Conference Decision 1112 (March 25, 1994),
adopted by the Third Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention, U.N. Environmental
Programme, UNEP/CHW.3/35 (1995); Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import into Africa and the
Control of Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes within Africa, openedforsignature Jan. 29,1991,
30 I.L.M. 773 (1991); The Fourth African, Caribbean, and Pacific States-European Economic Community
Convention of Lomd, opened forsignature March 22,1990,29 I.L.M. 783 (1990). One problem which could
be addressed by characterizing these shipments as a cognizable violation of the right to environmental
security is that the various conventions have "failed to coalesce into a single, dominant solution for the
externalities of hazardous waste exporting, which continue to be a vexing problem." See Marbury, supra note
137, at 262.
of human rights also allows a broader range of exported substances to be
subject to review: for example, the adverse environmental impacts caused by
the export of dangerous or environmentally risky products to the developing
world. Should these products not constitute "hazardous wastes," then they fall
outside the scope of the international conventions. However, the distributional
implications of such exports could well be caught by international anti-
discrimination standards applied to the environmental context.
Elevating environmental justice to the international level will require the
creation of new institutions. What tribunals, courts, or agencies can determine
the existence of environmental injustice? Are domestic courts or existing inter-
national human rights commissions (for example the United Nations Commis-
sion on Human Rights) sufficient? Or will new international human rights
tribunals need to be created? On a related note, elevating environmental justice
to the international level will also require the establishment of new rights. For
example, is there an internationally recognized right to public health or security
of the person?" 3 Such a right must exist in order for there to be a remedy for
its infringement by discriminatory environmental mismanagement or insecurity.
In bridging this particular gap, advocates for environmental justice should be
encouraged by the Stockholm Declaration, which as early as 1972 contemplated
the linkages between justice, equality, and environmental well-being:
Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate
conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life
of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to
protect and improve the environment for present and future genera-
tions.' 4'
A subsidiary question which arises (and has been particularly pivotal in the
United States jurisprudence) is whether the discrimination must be intentional
or whether proof of discriminatory impact suffices to justify a complaint.
In sum, the opportunities for environmental justice claims as a device to
promote transnational environmental security remain inchoate and unexplored.
It remains, though, that environmental justice claims at the intra-state level may
provide important linkages to the political right of self-determination. Such
claims recognize that maintenance of a "minimum quality of the environment"
is a prerequisite to the existence (and enjoyment) of civil and political rights,
as well as the dignity of the individual. Environmental justice claims can also
promote democratization by encouraging local and citizen group involvement
140. See Popovic, supra note 23, at 68 (discussing the right to live as broader than the traditional
concept of the right to life).
141. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm
Declaration), U.N. Doc. AICONF.48/14, 11 LLM. 1416 (1972), Principle 1.
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in the political process.'42 By "permitting individual victims to activate
international enforcement procedures," these claims increase political
participation together with transparency of information. 14' Environmental
justice claims at the macro, inter-state level may help link environmental
protection with socio-economic rights, such as the right to development.
Opportunities for development may be hindered when the developed world
passes the costs of its industrialization onto developing nations. Ultimately, a
macro, transnational conception of environmental justice can constitute a
theoretical justification for the promotion of equality in the sharing the benefits
and burdens of environmental management globally. As for the burdens,
environmental justice may justify distributive equality in terms of shouldering
the responsibilities of dealing with global environmental problems (e.g. climate
change, protecting the ozone layer). True distributive equality in this regard
would require the developed world to bear a considerably larger burden of
assuming these costs and responsibilities. This, in turn, feeds into the discourse
of "common but differentiated responsibilities" between developed and
developing countries which is growing into a principle of international
environmental law.'"
In the end, the question is not really whether punitive sanction or proactive
protection or environmental justice should constitute the dominant approach to
promote environmental security. Instead, a polycentric approach blending all
three paradigms might maximize policy results. Such a multifaceted approach
could promote environmental security by criminally punishing the most
invidious offender, dissuading the negligent offender through incentive-based
schemes, cleaning up blighted communities, according individuals a medium
to air grievances, and encouraging the global community to equally shoulder the
environmental externalities of industrialization.
142. This has been one of the strengths of the environmental justice movement in the United States.
See Taibi, supra note 103, at 491-92. ("IThis movement comprises a number of discrete and mostly
unaffiliated groups whose identity and membership largely center on a particular location or issue. These
groups are led by and draw their ranks not from educated professionals but from the more typically politically
alienated lower middle class."). On the international level, see Council of Europe, Convention on the
Protection of the Environment Through Criminal Law, supra note 71, at art. II (parties may grant
environmental non-governmental organizations the right to participate in criminal proceedings concerning
offenses under the Convention).
143. Popovic, supra note 23, at 89. See also id. at 88 ("A human rights mechanism would enhance
the prospects for protecting the environment because it would help the international community see the
environmental impact of war from the perspective of the most affected individuals and groups.").
144. See, e.g., Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New
Paradigm of Inter-state Relations, 10 E.J.I.L. 549, 577 (1999).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute criminalizes the willful infliction
of "widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment." The
inclusion of this crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC is cause for limited
celebration and some disappointment. The disappointment flows from the fact
that such conduct is already "prohibited" by virtue of Protocol I and the
ENMOD Convention. Nonetheless, the Rome Statute does provide a signifi-
cantly more viable mechanism to sanction this illegal conduct. It will, however,
be very difficult to prove "widespread, long-term, and severe damage;" proof
will be rendered more problematic owing to the conjunctive nature of these
terms. Additionally, the environmental war crime requires a very significant
level of knowledge and intentionality. Criminal behavior is not sanctioned on
an objective basis and, consequently, ignorance of the law might serve as a
defense. This would be less than desirable as environmental education and
transparency of knowledge would then be discouraged. The availability of
military advantage as a defense to the intentional infliction of widespread, long-
term and severe damage to the natural environment may further denude the
practical effect of Article 8(2)(b)(iv).
The inclusion of environmental crimes within the Rome Statute should
also give rise to considerable reflection. The principle point of contemplation
is the usefulness of the ICC as a device to promote environmental security.
Ultimately some of the foundational limitations of the ICC as a device to
promote such security flow not only from its structure, but also from the
punitive paradigm it embodies. As a result, this Article suggests that proactive
protection and environmental justice be woven into the international legal
response to environmental crimes. Proceeding with this blended approach
allows environmental security to serve as a lightning-rod uniting disparate
fields such as international criminal law, the law of war, international trade
law, international humanitarian law, and international anti-discrimination law.
Only through such a polycentric approach can environmental security be
promoted outside of the narrow confines of widespread long-term and severe
damage intentionally inflicted during an international armed conflict.
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